This paper documents that over the past 25 years, aggregate hourly real wages in the United States have become substantially more volatile relative to output. We use micro-data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that this increase in relative volatility is predominantly due to increases in the relative volatility of hourly wages across di¤erent groups of workers. Compositional changes, by contrast, account for at most 12% of the increase in relative wage volatility. Using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, we show that the observed increase in relative wage volatility is unlikely to come from changes outside of the labor market (e.g. smaller exogenous shocks or more aggressive monetary policy).
Introduction
The 25 years prior to the current recession were a time of unprecedented macroeconomic stability for the United States. During that period, referred to by many as the 'Great Moderation', the business cycle volatility of U.S. output declined by more than 50% and the volatility of many other macroeconomic aggregates fell by similar proportions. 1 In this paper, we show that the Great Moderation does not apply to one of the most prominent labor market aggregates: the average real hourly wage (or 'aggregate wages'for short). Speci…cally, we document the following results: 1. From 1948 1. From -1984 1. From to 1984 1. From -2006 , the business cycle volatility of the aggregate wage increased between 30 and 70 percent, depending on the …ltering method and nominal de ‡ator used.
2. As a result, the business cycle volatility of the aggregate wage relative to the volatility of aggregate output experienced a three-to four-fold increase over the two sample periods.
The increase in both absolute and relative volatility of aggregate wages raises several questions.
First, to what extent does this increase apply to di¤erent groups of workers? Second and related, how much of the increase in volatility is due to compositional changes of the workforce; i.e. a shift of the workforce towards jobs with more volatile wages? Third, to what extent is the increase in volatility related to structural changes in the U.S. labor market? Fourth, how do such labor market changes contribute to our understanding of business cycle ‡uctuations in general and the Great Moderation in particular?
To answer the …rst and second question, we use microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct hourly wage series for di¤erent groups of workers. We document that the increase in absolute volatility of the real wage is not generalized but concentrated among male, skilled and young workers. Also, there are large di¤erences across industries, with absolute volatilities of hourly wages in many industries decreasing. However, these decreases are generally modest and thus, the volatility of real hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggregate output increases substantially across most of decompositions considered. We call this phenomenon the 'Great Increase in Relative Volatility of Real Wages'.
To quantify how much of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is due to increases in relative volatility of wages across di¤erent groups of workers, we develop an accounting method that allows us to decompose the increase in aggregate wage volatility into compositional changes and changes in relative volatilities and correlations. The main result coming out of this exercise is that the large increase in relative volatility of aggregate wages is predominantly due to the increase in the relative volatility of wages of the di¤erent worker groups. Compositional changes of the labor force, by contrast, account for at most 12% of the increase in the relative volatility of the aggregate wage. This suggests that the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is due to changes in the economic environment that a¤ected wage dynamics of most groups of workers, although to varying degrees.
To address the third and fourth question, we build a small Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a stylized wage setting function that allows for varying degrees of wage rigidity. We calibrate the model consistent with U.S. data and show that while changes in the importance of exogenous shock processes can have a sizable e¤ect on the absolute volatility and cyclicality of aggregate wages, their e¤ect on the relative volatility of wages is negligible. Similarly, structural changes to the economy that do not directly a¤ect the labor market (e.g. a more aggressive monetary policy response to in ‡ation) are unlikely to have a large e¤ect on the relative volatility of wages. By contrast, more ‡exible wage setting is capable of accounting for a large fraction of the observed increase in relative wage volatility and simultaneously implies a substantial decrease in the magnitude of business cycle ‡uctuations for given exogenous shocks. 2 We con…rm the robustness of our …ndings in the larger DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) that contains many frictions and shocks. These results suggest that the hypothesis of increased wage ‡exibility has a lot of potential to rationalize the observed changes in U.S. labor market dynamics and at the same time provides a promising new explanation for the Great Moderation.
The hypothesis of increased ‡exibility in wage setting is appealing for several reasons. On the one hand, it is consistent with the documented rise in individual earnings volatility in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt, 1994; Dynan et al., 2008) . On the other hand, the U.S. labor market has undergone several important changes over the past 25 years that are likely to have led to increased ‡exibility in wage setting. Among them are the large decrease in private sector unionization (e.g. Farber and Western, 2001 ); the shift towards performance-pay contracts (e.g. Lemieux et al., 2008) ; the erosion of the minimum wage (e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996) ; and the increase in temporary help services (e.g. Estevao and Lach, 1999) and overtime work hours (e.g. Kuhn and Lozano, 2008) . In the last part of the paper, we discuss in more detail the cases of deunionization and performance-pay. On theoretical grounds, both deunionization and the shift towards performance-pay contracts should make wages more sensitive to current business cycle conditions, thus increasing their volatility. On empirical grounds, this is con…rmed by Lemieux et al. 2 Increased wage ‡exibility does not render the economy immune to large business cycle shocks such as the ones experienced during the recent …nancial crisis. Our results suggest that the e¤ects of these large shocks would have been more severe if wage setting had been as rigid as in the early 1980s.
(2008) who document that wages are more responsive to changes in local labor market conditions for non-union and performance-pay contracts. Furthermore, we show that the decrease in unionization and the shift towards performance-pay contracts roughly coincide with the evolution of relative wage volatility over time.
Since we started working on this project, the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages during the Great Moderation has been noted in an unpublished manuscript by Gourio (2007) and a recent paper by Gali and Van Rens (2009) . 3 To the best of our knowledge, however, our paper is the …rst to document that this increase in the relative volatility of wages is generalized across di¤erent worker groups and not due to compositional changes of the labor force. As we argue in the paper, this result is important because it suggests that the increase in wage volatility is related to structural changes in the labor market and in particular to increased ‡exibility in wage setting that a¤ects wage dynamics of all groups of workers. At the same time, we uncover that increased wage ‡exibility is also a powerful mechanism to account for the Great Moderation. 4 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we document the increase in wage volatility of di¤erent aggregate hourly wage measures. Section 3 presents changes in relative wage volatility across di¤erent worker decompositions and implements the volatility accounting exercise.
Section 4 describes our DSGE model and simulates the e¤ects of increased wage ‡exibility. Section 5 explores the decline in unionization and the shift towards performance-pay as potential sources of increased wage ‡exibility. Furthermore, we discuss an alternative hypothesis based on smaller labor search costs put forward by Gali and Van Rens (2009) . Section 6 concludes.
Aggregate hourly wages during the Great Moderation
In this section, we document the increase in volatility of aggregate real hourly wages in the United
States. We …rst describe the construction of our preferred measure of aggregate hourly wages and present the main results. Then, we discuss alternative aggregate wage series and show further results. For the sake of brevity, we keep the description of the data to a minimum. An appendix that is available on the authors'websites provides more detailed information and contains several robustness checks.
3 Champagne (2007) documents the increase in wage volatility in his M.A. thesis and compares results across di¤erent measures of aggregate real wages. The present paper is a continuation of this project. 4 Davis and Kahn (2008) suggest that greater wage ‡exibility may o¤er a uni…ed explanation for the observed rise in income volatility and the Great Moderation. However, they do not formally investigate this conjecture. Levene's (1960) test of equal variance indicates that these changes in volatility are highly signi…cant. 7 The di¤erent evolution of output and wage volatility is even more striking when considering relative standard deviations. As the last column of 5 The …rst-di¤erence …lter removes stochastic trends but also cuts out a substantial part of business cycle ‡uctua-tions. The HP …lter is close to a high-pass …lter that removes trends but leaves all other ‡uctuations, including high frequency ‡uctuations. The BP …lter removes both low and high frequency ‡uctuations and only keeps ‡uctuations with periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters. 6 When computing the volatility of aggregate wages or other macro variables, we drop the …rst and last year to improve the accuracy of the …lters. Standard errors are computed via the delta method from GMM-based estimates.
Data
See the appendix for details. 7 The largest p-value of 0.13 occurs for the …rst-di¤erenced wage series. Since …rst-di¤erencing …lters out a substantial part of business cycle ‡uctuations, we attribute less importance to this exception. Table 1 shows, the volatility of wages relative to the volatility of output has increased by a factor of 3 to 3.5 over the two samples. These ratios are far above the changes in relative volatility observed for other macro aggregates during the Great Moderation (see discussion in Section 4).
To further illustrate the change in relative volatility of aggregate wages, we plot the volatility of output and aggregate wages over 8-year rolling windows. As the …rst panel of Figure 1 illustrates, the volatility of output fell precipitously in the 1980s whereas the volatility of the aggregate wage steadily increased steadily during the 1980s and 1990s. The standard error bands indicate that both of these changes are signi…cant. As shown in the second panel, the relative volatility of the aggregate wage thus increased dramatically and signi…cantly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.
Thereafter, the relative volatility of aggregate wages returns to an intermediate level that remains, however, more than twice as high than the level before the mid-1980s.
We take away two main results from Table 1 and Figure 1 . First, as the volatility of output drops during the Great Moderation, the absolute volatility of aggregate wages increases. Second, the drop in output volatility is proportionally much larger than the increase in aggregate wage volatility. The three-to four-fold increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is thus driven to a large part by the drop in output volatility. The challenge for any theory is to explain how there can be such a marked fall in output volatility without a similar fall in the volatility of aggregate wages.
Evidence from other aggregate wage measures
The aggregate wage series from the LPC program is a very broad measure of compensation that includes not only wages and salaries but also stock options. Mehran and Tracy (2001) argue that this may provide a misleading picture of the evolution and volatility of compensation in the 1990s since these stock options are recorded when realized, not when handed out to employees. We thus check the robustness of our results with three other measures of aggregate hourly measures constructed, respectively, from the CPS May/MORG, the NBER manufacturing database and the Private Economy Labor Quality (PELQ) database.
As described in more detail in the next section, the hourly wage measure from the CPS Table 2 presents the results for the di¤erent aggregate wage series together with an annualized version of the LPC measure, both in …rst-di¤erenced and HP …ltered form. 8 The PELQ measure shows the largest increases in wage volatility, matching the results of the LPC measure almost exactly. The NBER manufacturing measure and the CPS measure show a somewhat smaller increase in absolute wage volatility, but their relative wage volatility still increases by a factor of 2.5 or more.
We can only speculate about the reason for these di¤erences. For the NBER measure, they may be due to the exclusive focus on production workers in manufacturing; for the CPS measure, they may be due to top-coding of large income workers who have seen a more important increase in wage volatility in the post-1984 period than the average worker (see next section). The key point remains,
however, that as the volatility of output drops during the Great Moderation, the volatility of all of these wage measures remains stable or even increases slightly. As a result, the relative volatility of aggregate wages increases by a factor of 2.6 to 3.8 between the pre-1984 and the post-1984 period.
Another aggregate wage measure to consider is the Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) series from 8 As recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the HP …lter parameter to 6:25. We do not report BP …ltered results for annual data because the BP …lter requires us to cut ‡uctuations of 2 years or less. This would remove a potentially important part of business cycle ‡uctuations. 9 Another obvious candidate for di¤erences in wage volatility across di¤erent wage series is measurement error.
For measurement error to explain the very di¤erent evolution of wage volatility between the AHE series and the other aggregate wage series, however, it would have to be the case that the measurement error for the AHE series
We start with di¤erences in the worker population covered. The AHE measure covers only production and non-supervisory workers, which account for about 80% of total payroll, whereas the aggregate wage measures from the LPC, the CPS May/MORG and the PELQ database are representative of the entire workforce. 10 It is possible that the wage volatility of the 20% of workers not covered by the AHE increases by so much in the post-1984 period that it more than outweighs the drop in wage volatility in the AHE measure. To assess this possibility, we use the CPS May/MORG data together with occupational de…nitions from the BLS to recreate an hourly wage series for production and non-supervisory workers, as presumably captured by the AHE measure, and an hourly wage series for the remaining private-sector workers. We …nd that the wage volatility of both of these series remains approximatively constant over the pre-1984 and the post-1984 sample period.
As a result, the wage volatility of both worker groups relative to the volatility of output increases by a factor of more than 2. Second, we consider di¤erences in earnings concepts. The AHE does not include tips and records commissions and bonuses only if earned and paid in the same period. The CPS May/MORG wage series is the closest to the AHE measure in this respect because it records commissions and bonuses only if they are part of usual earnings. This leaves tips as a di¤erence. As Abraham et al. (1998) report, the BEA estimates tips to be a mere 0.3% of total weekly compensation in 1993. Hence, even if the volatility of tips had increased greatly, this would not explain why the volatility of the CPS May/MORG wage measure increased by such a large amount relative to the AHE wage measure.
Third, we turn to the issue of underrepresentation of young establishments in the CES. As Abraham et al. (1998) explain, the CES sample of reporting establishments was not rotated regularly for most of the sample period we consider. Hence, young establishments are typically underreprerelative to the LPC, CPS May/MORG and PELQ measure decreased substantially. We know of no evidence that points in this direction. 10 According to Abraham et al. (1998) , the proportion of production and non-supervisory workers in total employment has remained roughly constant over the 1973-1993 period.
sented. Furthermore, the CES sample grew from about 166,000 establishments in 1980 to about 333,000 establishments in 1993, which is likely to have led to an increase of the proportion of young establishments in the CES sample. While Abraham et al. (1998) conclude that the e¤ect of this expansion on aggregate wage trends is likely to be modest, it is possible that this expansion explains at least part of the di¤erence in the evolution of wage volatility. Absent micro data on the di¤erent CES establishments, however, we cannot investigate this possibility further. The di¤erence in the evolution of wage volatility for the AHE measure relative to the other aggregate wage measures thus remains a puzzle. Given the similarity of results across the LPC, the CPS May/MORG, the NBER manufacturing database and the PELQ database, it appears safe to conclude, however, that the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is a robust feature of the data and not an artifact of some particular measurement of compensation or restriction to a narrow segment of the worker population.
A closer look at disaggregated data
To further investigate the increase in volatility of real hourly wages, we take the CPS data and construct wage series for di¤erent groups of workers. We …rst describe important details about the CPS data and then look at the evolution of wage volatility for di¤erent groups of workers. Based on these decompositions, we develop an accounting method that allows us to quantify how much of the increase in the volatility of the aggregate wage is due to increases in wage volatility of di¤erent worker groups.
CPS data
The CPS is the o¢ cial household-based labor market survey in the U.S. The second important issue is the CPS redesign in 1994, more speci…cally the treatment of weekly overtime earnings, tips, and commissions (OTC). Before 1994, hourly workers were asked to report their hourly wage rate, without a speci…ed question on OTC earnings. After 1994, a speci…c question was added to hourly workers about weekly OTC earnings. 15 The consequence of this redesign is a potential discontinuity in the wage series for hourly workers, which could lead to an overstatement of the wage volatility in the post-1984 period. To check whether this may be the case, we compute two alternative wage series for hourly workers. First, we simply drop OTC 12 Alternatively, we could have computed hourly wage series from the CPS March Supplements. The CPS March data would have the advantage that it starts in 1963 rather than 1973. However, before 1976, only weekly earnings can be computed, which is a biased measure of hourly wages if hours worked vary across weeks. Furthermore, as
Lemieux (2006) argues, CPS March wage measures are subject to substantial measurement error that are not present in the CPS May/MORG data. The reason for this di¤erence is that the CPS March collects labor earnings only on a yearly basis. The CPS May/MORG, by contrast, asks directly for the wage rate for hourly workers. This seems to yield more precise answers. For these reasons, we refrain from using CPS March data. 13 For hourly worker, wages are topcoded at $99.99 per hour, a threshold that is rarely crossed. For non-hourly workers, weekly earnings are topcoded at $999 before 1989, $1,923 before 1998 and $2,884 thereafter. A substantial share of individuals is above that threshhold at any time of the sample. 14 See Feenberg and Poterba (1992), Polivka (2000) and Schmitt (2003) . 15 For non-hourly workers, the usual weekly earnings include OTC earnings throughout the whole sample. As a result, the CPS redesign did not a¤ect the usual weekly earnings of non-hourly workers.
earnings after 1994. Second, we adjust the wage series for non-hourly workers before 1994 with a linear trend so as to correct for any discontinuity. In both cases, all of our results remain robust, meaning that the addition of the OTC question in 1994 for non-hourly workers does not lead to an overstatement of the volatility in CPS wages.
Wage volatility across di¤erent decompositions
We consider four di¤erent decompositions: (i) skill / gender; (ii) skill / age; (iii) skill / employment status; and (iv) skill / industry a¢ liation. 16 Following Krusell et al. (2000) and many others, we measure skill by years of schooling. To keep the decomposition manageable, we consider only two groups, de…ning a 'skilled worker' as someone with a college degree (bachelor) or more, and an 'unskilled worker' as someone with less than a college degree. The de…nitions of the other decompositions are described below.
For each of the decompositions, we compute an average hourly wage series and follow the same procedure as for the aggregate wage series: …lter the series to extract the business cycle component;
split the sample into a pre-1984 and a post-1984 period; compute the volatility of the hourly wage series both in absolute terms and relative to the volatility of aggregate output. 17 Aside from the volatility of the hourly wage, we also report the average wage share and the volatility of the hours'
share, de…ned, respectively, as the fraction of total earnings and total hours accounted for by a given worker group (the formal de…nition is provided in Section 3.3). Both of these statistics turn out to be important for the volatility accounting exercise below.
Gender / skill decomposition Table 3 reports the decomposition for gender and skill. The …rst noticeable change across subsamples is the increase in the relative importance of skilled and female workers (as measured by average wage shares). Second, we observe that the absolute volatility of hourly wages increases for all but skilled female workers for which wage volatility falls slightly. Relative to the volatility of output, however, the volatility of wages increases substantially across all groups. This is especially pronounced for male skilled workers who see their relative wage volatility increase by a factor of 4.5. By contrast to the hourly wage, the volatility of hours'share decreases markedly for all groups. 16 Given the discussion about the e¤ects of deunionization on wage ‡exibility in Section 5, it would be interesting to do a decomposition along union membership as well. Unfortunately, the CPS MORG does not provide union data before 1983, and for 1981 and 1982 the CPS May contains only very few (respectively no) individuals with information on union membership. This makes it impossible to compute reliable wage series for unionized and non-unionized workers for the pre-1984 sample. 17 All results are reported for H-P …ltered data with constant 6:25 as before. We cut o¤ the …rst and last year of the sample to improve the accuracy of the …lter. All the conclusions are robust to alternative …lters.
As a result, the relative volatility of hours'share increases by much less and actually falls for both male and female skilled workers. olds ('grown-ups'); and 60-70 year olds ('old workers'). As the changes in the average wage shares
Age / skill decomposition
show, there is a substantial shift in the workforce from young to grown-up workers between the pre-1984 and the post-1984 period. In terms of volatility, we …nd that the absolute volatility for all but the young skilled workers decreases. However, this increase is modest for all but the old skilled workers. As a result, the relative volatility of wages still increases strongly for all but this last group. In particular, the relative wage volatility of young skilled workers increases by a factor of 4.5. For hours'share, in turn, the picture is very similar to the gender-skill decomposition: in absolute terms, the hours'share volatility falls substantially for almost all worker groups and thus, the relative volatility remains on average more or less unchanged.
18
Employment situation / skill decomposition Table 5 shows the decomposition for employment status and skill, where employment status is measured by whether a worker is paid an hourly wage rate or a non-hourly salary in his main job. As for the gender / skill decomposition, the evolution of the average wage share indicates that there is a shift towards a more skilled workforce. The volatility of wages increases for all but the non-hourly unskilled group. The relative volatility of wages thus increases markedly for all worker groups. Interestingly, this increase is most pronounced for hourly unskilled workers and non-hourly skilled workers, the two opposites in this decomposition. In terms of hours'share, the situation is similar to the above decompositions: the volatility of hours'share decreases substantially and thus, its change in relative volatility is much more muted than for the hourly wage.
Industry / skill decomposition Table 6 reports the decomposition for industry a¢ liation and skill. We choose a relatively detailed decomposition into 10 private sector industries and one public administration sector. The importance of the wage share for the service sector increases markedly whereas the wage share of unskilled manufacturing groups decreases. In terms of volatility, we see that the wage volatility of many groups decreases. As for the age / skill decomposition, however, this decrease in volatility is generally modest and thus, the increase in relative volatility of wages remains large for all but 18 As a sidenote, Gomme et al. (2004) and Jaimovich and Siu (2008) document that the volatility of hours displays a U-shaped pattern with respect to age. As Table 4 shows, the same U-shaped pattern is present for the volatility of hours'share.
communications and public sector workers (both skilled and unskilled). We return to discussing this exception in the following section. For hours'share, the picture is reversed. Most worker groups see a large decrease in absolute volatility and thus, the relative volatility of hours'share increases only modestly on average.
We take away three stylized facts from the di¤erent decompositions. First, there are important shifts in the workforce as measured by average wage shares. Second, there are substantial di¤erences in the evolution of wage volatility across di¤erent worker groups. The largest increases in volatility occur for male, skilled and young workers. Many other groups, especially in the industry / skill decomposition, see their wage volatility decrease. However, these decreases are relatively modest in absolute terms and thus, the volatility of real hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggregate output increases substantially for almost every worker group. This phenomenon is what we call in the introduction 'The Great Increase in Relative Volatility of Real Wages'. Third and …nally, there is a more substantial decrease in the volatility of hours'share for most worker groups. As a result, changes in the relative volatility of hours'share are on average much more modest. These stylized facts are robust with respect to other decompositions that we attempted with the CPS data (details are available from the authors upon request).
Volatility accounting
An obvious question coming out of the di¤erent decompositions is how much of the increase in absolute and relative volatility of aggregate wages is due to changes in wage volatilities within the di¤erent worker groups and how much is due to compositional changes of the workforce (i.e. a shift of the workforce towards jobs with more volatile wages). To quantify these e¤ects, we develop an accounting method that allows us to decompose the increase in aggregate wage volatility into compositional changes, changes in volatilities of hourly wages and hours' shares, and changes in correlations thereof.
By de…nition, the aggregate real hourly wage w t equals the sum of average real hourly wages w i;t across worker groups i of some decomposition (e.g. skilled and unskilled), weighted by the respective hours shares h i;t = H i;t =H t ; i.e.
where H t and H i;t denote total aggregate hours worked and hours worked by group i. Next, we let x i;t = w i;t h i;t be the 'wage component'of worker group i and compute growth rates of the above decomposition. We obtain log w t w t w t 1
where s i;t 1 = x i;t 1 =w t 1 denotes the 'wage share'of worker group i. Given this decomposition, we can express the variance of the growth rate of the aggregate real hourly wage as
COV (s i;t 1 log x i;t ; s j;t 1 log x j;t ):
To make this variance decomposition operational for our accounting exercise, we assume that wage shares s i;t 1 are approximately constant over the sample under consideration; i.e. s i;t 1 = s i . For each of the decompositions, we check this approximation and …nd the induced error to be negligible.
This allows us to express the di¤erence in aggregate hourly wage variances over two subsamples (denoted 1 and 2) as 2 w;2
where 2 w;2 denotes the variance of aggregate wage growth V ( log w t ) in subsample 2; (x i;2 ; x j;2 ) = COV ( log x i;t ; log x j;t )= p V ( log x i;t )V ( log x j;t ) denotes the correlation coe¢ cient between wage component of group i and wage component of group j in subsample 2; and so forth for the other elements. Our objective is to decompose 2 w;2 2 w;1 into (i) changes in wage shares; (ii) changes in wage volatilities across worker groups; (iii) changes in hours' share volatilities across worker groups; and (iv) changes in correlation coe¢ cients. As the above expression shows, this is not straightforward because the di¤erent moments enter both additively and multiplicatively.
Consider …rst the contribution of changes in wage shares versus the contribution of changes in covariances of the wage components (which captures the remaining three changes). By adding and substracting di¤erent elements, we can expand the above expression as
This decomposes the change in the variance of aggregate wages into changes in wage shares given covariances of wage components of the …rst subsample and changes in covariances of wage components given wage shares of the second subsample. Alternatively, we can expand the above expression as 2 w;2
In this way, we decompose the change in the variance of aggregate wages into changes in covariances of wage components given wage shares of the …rst subsample and changes in wage shares given covariances of wage components of the second subsample. Since there is no particular economic justi…cation to prefer one expansion over the other, we take the average over the two and obtain 2 w;2
This averaging over two di¤erent extremes is obviously an arbitrary choice. We …nd, however, that all of our robust are robust if we used instead one of the two extremes.
We are left with the decomposition of changes in covariances of wage components into changes of variances and correlation coe¢ cients of average hourly wages and hours'shares. We can express any covariance between wage components of worker group i and j as (
Applying the same averaging over the two possible expansions to this expression (see the appendix for details), we obtain the following …nal decomposition of aggregate wage variances over two subsamples
" (w i;2 ;w j;2 )+ (w i;1 ;w j;1 ) 2 w i;2 w j;2 w i;1 w j;1 + (w i;2 ;h j;2 )+ (w i;1 ;h j;1 ) 2
. 19 Note that for i = j, (w i ; w j ) wi wj simpli…es to However, our decomposition is complicated by the fact that the sum of log hourly wages of di¤erent worker groups does not equal the log of aggregate hourly wages.
Part (1) is the portion of the change in the variance of aggregate wages accounted for by changes in wage volatility of di¤erent worker groups; part (2) is the portion accounted for by changes in the volatility of hours shares; part (3) is the portion accounted for by changes in correlations coe¢ cients across hourly wages and hours shares; and part (4) is unchanged from before, measuring the portion of the change in the variance of aggregate wages accounted for by compositional changes in the workforce as measured by the di¤erence in wage shares.
The proposed accounting exercise can be implemented for the di¤erence in absolute variances of aggregate wages (described above) as well as for the di¤erence in relative variances of aggregate wages; i.e. Tables 7 and 8 show the results of our accounting exercise, both for the change in absolute volatility of aggregate wages (i.e. This approximation holds extremely well. 20 As Table 7 shows, compositional changes account for more than 100% of the increase in the absolute volatility of aggregate wages for all four decompositions discussed in Section 3.2. The contributions of changes in wage volatility, hours share volatility and correlation coe¢ cients, by contrast, di¤er wildly across decompositions. This variation in results should not come as a surprise.
For example, the absolute volatility of wages increases substantially for most groups of the gender / skill and the employment status / skill decomposition, but decreases for most groups of the other two decompositions. As a result, the contribution of changes in wage volatility across worker groups to the increase in aggregate wage volatility is strongly positive for the gender / skill and the employment status / skill decompositions, but strongly negative for the other two decompositions.
Similar di¤erences explain the large variations in contributions of changes in hours share volatility and correlations across the di¤erent decompositions.
The picture is very di¤erent in Table 8 where we display the same accounting exercise for the change in relative volatility of aggregate wages. Now, for every decomposition, changes in the relative volatility of wages across worker groups account for the bulk of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages. Compositional changes and changes in the relative volatility of hours shares, by contrast, account for no more than 12% (in the employment situation / skill decomposition). This di¤erence in results is due to the fact that the volatility of wages relative to the 20 Coen-Pirani and Castro (2008) use the same approximation in their decomposition of hours volatility. volatility of output increases strongly for almost all worker groups in each of the decompositions while the change in composition and the change in relative volatility of hours share is generally modest.
Additional evidence from individual panel data
The decompositions we consider remain averages for workers with broad characteristics (e.g. male and skilled). Hence, it could be that the documented increase in relative wage volatility is the result of compositional changes within the di¤erent worker groups considered. 21 However, starting 2008) in the sense that we …nd substantial heterogeneity about the change in absolute wage volatility across the di¤erent decompositions. 22 Compositional changes within worker groups may play some role for this heterogeneity. At the same time, these panel studies report that individual income volatility has either increased or remained roughly constant. Since the volatility of output fell by about 60% during the same time period, the volatility of income relative to the volatility of output must have increased substantially. This is entirely consistent with the conclusions from our accounting exercise that the across-the-board increase in relative wage volatility is the main source of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages. The challenge is to come up with a theory that rationalizes both the drop in the volatility of output and the relatively modest changes in the magnitude of wage ‡uctuations across di¤erent workers groups. 21 Unfortunately, the CPS data does not allow us to discard this possibility because the same individual appears only for two periods of four months, separated by eight consecutive months during which the individual is left out of the survey. 22 Given that the panel dimension is absent in the CPS data, it is di¢ cult to compare our results further with the results from PSID studies. In addition, we drop self-employed workers, which play an important role in Jensen and Shore's (2008) analysis.
Wage volatility in general equilibrium
To assess the potential of di¤erent explanations for the change in relative wage volatility, we build a small DSGE model with real wage rigidity. The model is similar to the one presented in Blanchard The model is set in a representative agent framework. We thus see our exercise …rst and foremost as an account of aggregate labor market dynamics. However, the e¤ects of changes in wage rigidity that we highlight below apply equally to speci…c labor markets (e.g. the labor market for skilled workers in a given industry). As such, we consider our exploration also as a general …rst pass at explaining why the relative volatility of wages has increased substantially for most worker groups.
Model
Since most of the model is standard, we keep the exposition to a minimum and refer the reader to the appendix for a full description. In the following, upper-case variables denote observed macroeconomic quantities and lower-case variables denote percent deviations from appropriately transformed steady states.
The economy is populated by 3 types of agents: a continuum of identical worker-households, a continuum of identical …rms and a monetary authority. Households discount time at rate and have preferences over consumption and leisure. Period t utility is given by
where C t and N t are a composite consumption good and hours worked, respectively; Z t 1 is an exogenous preference shock; and 1= > 0 denotes the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Households maximize present discounted utility by choosing consumption, hours worked, and investment in either physical capital K t+1 (1 )K t or nominal bonds B t+1 subject to the budget constraint
23 Gourio (2007) , in an unpublished note, proposes a similar model to analyze the e¤ects of changes in the degree of wage rigidity. His calibration and analysis is more limited, however.
where W t , R K t and R n t are the real wage rate, the real net rental rate of capital, and the gross nominal bond return, respectively; P t is the aggregate price level; and D t are dividends from a perfectly diversi…ed portfolio of claims to …rms.
Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good with constant returns to scale technology
where A t denotes an exogenous labor-augmenting technology shock. The di¤erent …rms'goods are combined into the …nal composite good according to the Kimball (1995) aggregator. 24 Hence, each …rm is a monopolistic competitor, maximizing pro…ts subject to a downward-sloping demand curve.
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the following rule
where t denotes the gross in ‡ation rate of the composite good's price, and Y t =Y t 1 is the growth rate of aggregate output.
We impose two market frictions for the determination of equilibrium allocations. First, as is common in the New Keynesian literature, we assume that price setting is staggered following Calvo (1983), with each …rm facing a constant probability in any given period of being able to reoptimize its price. This implies a loglinearized New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) for in ‡ation
with mc t denoting real marginal cost. The slope coe¢ cient in this equation is a nonlinear function of price setting and demand parameters (see, for example, Eichenbaum and Fischer, 2007) . 25 Second, we posit as in Blanchard and Gali (2007) that real wages adjust sluggishly according to the following loglinear wage setting curve
where mrs t denotes the workers'marginal rate of substitution
24 Kimball's (1995) aggregator is a generalization of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and provides ‡exibility in mapping micro data on price adjustment to aggregate in ‡ation dynamics. See, for example, Eichenbaum and Fischer (2007) . 25 Alternatively, we could have left prices completely ‡exible in which case the model collapses to the RBC benchmark. None of the main results below are a¤ected by this simpli…cation. However, it would imply that wages and labor productivity share exactly the same loglinear dynamics, which is not the case in the data.
Given this wage, …rms hire labor to satisfy their optimality condition
In words, wages are assumed to be fully allocative but for some unmodelled friction, workers are not on their labor supply schedule as de…ned by the marginal rate of substitution. This formulation of the labor market is admittedly ad-hoc. Yet, there are several reasons for proceeding in this way.
First, the simple form of the labor market allows for a straightforward analysis of the e¤ects of increased wage ‡exibility. Second, the next section discusses evidence suggesting that wages indeed play an allocative role over the business cycle. Third, very similar formulations can be derived search-based models have many advantages compared to the present stylized model. 26 As we discuss below, however, changes in wage rigidity turn out to be as crucial for search-based models as they are for our more stylized formulation to match observed changes in relative wage volatility.
For capital markets, we keep the competitive markets assumption. The household's …rst-order condition for investment in physical capital is
and the …rm's demand for capital is
Likewise, the household …rst-order condition for investment in nominal bonds is
As is clear from both (9) and (11), the preference shock plays a similar role than a credit shock that drives a wedge between market returns and the intertemporal rate of substitution. Everything else constant, an increase in z t lowers current consumption, which in turn lowers mrs t and w t (depending on the degree of wage rigidity ).
Calibration
We calibrate the model to quarterly data. Except for the degree of wage rigidity , the di¤erent model parameters are kept constant for all simulations and are set as follows.
Calibrated model parameters For the shock calibration, we also follow the literature and let the technology shock and the preference shock follow independent AR(1) processes a t = a a t 1 + " at with " at iid (0;
We estimate the two parameters for each process directly from the data. For the technology shock process, we use a quarterly approximation of the total factor productivity measure constructed by Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), which controls for variable factor utilization. We convert this measure into logarithms, subtract a linear trend and then estimate a and "a by ordinary least squares (OLS). 27 For the preference shock process, we measure z t as the residual from the Euler equation for nominal bonds in (11); i.e. z t = E t c t+1 (r n t E t t+1 ). 28 The nominal short-rate 27 Substracting a linear trend implies that total factor productivity has a deterministic exponential growth rate, as assumed for example in King and Rebelo (2000) . Our results are robust when we apply a higher-order detrending procedure. 28 Alternatively, we could measure z t as the residual from the investment Euler equation in (9) . There are two reasons we prefer the bond Euler equation. First, the rental rate of capital in the investment Euler equation has to be inferred from macroeconomic quantities using the …rm's capital demand condition in (10) . Both the real marginal cost and capital stocks are di¢ cult to measure and thus, we have less con…dence in the resulting series for the rental rate of capital than bond prices and in ‡ation, which are directly observable in the data. Second, the investment Euler equation may be a¤ected by investment-speci…c technology shocks. Primiceri et al. (2006) argue that such investment-speci…c shocks neutralize a large part of preference shocks, which would lead to a substantially smoother series for z t . These investment-speci…c shocks do not enter into the bond Euler equation.
in this equation is measured by the 3-month treasury bill rate. Expectations of future consumption growth and in ‡ation are estimated from a bivariate VAR in the two variables, with consumption being measured by real chain-weighted per capita expenditures of non-durables and services and in ‡ation being measured by the growth rate of the GDP de ‡ator. 29 As for total factor productivity, we subtract a linear trend from the obtained series of z t and then estimate z and " z by OLS. The …nal parameter we need to calibrate is the degree of wage rigidity . Since the wage setting equation in (6) is reduced-form, we cannot calibrate it based on micro evidence. We thus set such that the model calibrated with the above parameter values and shock estimates for the pre-1984 period matches the standard deviation of HP …ltered output. This yields a value of = 0:85, implying that the pre-1984 period was characterized by a substantial degree of wage rigidity.
Simulations
We compute several simulations of the model to illustrate the importance of increased ‡exibility in wage setting. First, we discuss how model under the baseline calibration matches salient labor market dynamics in the pre-1984 period. Second, we assess to what extent a reduction in the volatility of exogenous shocks can generate an increase in the relative volatility of wages. Third, 29 Based on Schwarz'Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), we select a VAR in 5 lags. The di¤erent results are robust to alternative lag speci…cations. 30 For both sub-periods, the correlation between the innovations is negligible (0.11 and -0.03, respectively). Hence, our assumption that the two shock processes are independent is valid.
we consider the e¤ects of lowering the degree of wage rigidity by setting = 0:15 while keeping the shock processes at their pre-1984 calibration. This decrease in wage rigidity is motivated in part by direct evidence from Kahn (1997) who uses PSID data to show that the frequency of wage adjustments has increased over the past decades. Furthermore, we discuss in the next section di¤erent sources that may have led to this type of increase in wage ‡exibility. At the same time, neither Kahn's (1997) study nor the evidence discussed in the next section allows us to conclude that wage setting has become almost completely ‡exible as implied by = 0:15. Rather, we want to assess with this simulation the extent to which increased wage ‡exibility is capable of a¤ecting labor market dynamics. 31 Fourth, we keep = 0:15 and adapt the shock calibration to the post-84
estimates so as to assess how changes in the relative importance of shocks interact with increased wage ‡exibility.
While the main focus of our investigation is to quantify the potential of increased wage ‡exibility to generate the observed increase in relative volatility of wages, we are also interested in assessing whether our theory can replicate other prominent changes in labor market dynamics. In particular,
Stiroh (2009), Barnichon (2008) and Gali and Gambetti (2009) document that the Great Moderation
period has been characterized by an increase in the relatively volatility of hours worked and a fall in the correlation of labor productivity with output and hours. The …rst three columns of Table 9 document these changes. The volatility of both hours and labor productivity has increased relative to output. However, this increase in relative volatility is far smaller than the relative increase in volatility of aggregate wages. The correlation of labor productivity with output has turned from robustly positive to zero whereas the correlation with hours has turned substantially negative. A similar development applies to wages, which have become mildly negatively correlated. 32 
Baseline calibration
Simulation 1 in Table 9 displays the second moments generated by the model for our baseline calibration with = 0:85 and the shock processes set to their pre-1984 estimates. As discussed above, the degree of wage rigidity is chosen such that the model matches the pre-1984 volatility of output in the data. Despite its simplicity, the model does a surprisingly good job in matching other pre-1984 data moments. In particular, the model generates a relative volatility and correlation coe¢ cient of wages that is only slightly above the values in the data. The relative volatility of labor productivity and its correlation with output and hours are also close to their data counterparts. 31 We note, however, that the simulation results presented below change only little for values between = 0:3 and = 0. Table 9 shows, the smaller estimates of the two shock processes leads to a substantial fall in output volatility of about 40% as well as a fall in the cyclicality of wages and labor productivity. Hence, the 'good luck hypothesis'is quite powerful in accounting for the Great Moderation and is consistent with some of the changes in labor market dynamics highlighted by Stiroh (2009), Barnichon (2008) and Gali and Gambetti (2009) . At the same time, the decrease in shock volatility in the post-1984 period leads to a substantial fall in the volatility of wages such that the relative volatility of aggregate wages hardly changes. The 'good luck hypothesis'on its own thus fails to account for the sizable increase in the relative volatility of wages that we observe in the data.
To understand these results, it is useful to consider a graphical illustration of the labor market. to n (and output) thus remain more or less unchanged. 33 Figure 3a illustrates the e¤ect of a preference shock on labor demand and wage setting. Everything else constant, the preference shock reduces current consumption, which implies a negative income e¤ect that shifts down the wage setting curve. Aside from negligible e¤ects from dynamic capital adjustments (not shown here), the labor demand schedule remains una¤ected and thus, the economy adjusts from point A to its new equilibrium at point B. Similar to the technology shock, smaller preference shocks result in smaller shifts of the wage setting curve. But as long as the degree of wage rigidity and the wage elasticity of labor demand remain unchanged, the relative magnitude of adjustments in w and n remain more or less the same. This explains why changes in technology and preference shocks have hardly any e¤ect on the relative volatility of wages. By contrast, changes in technology and 33 Our explanation ignores dynamic e¤ects coming through movements in capital stocks. Since capital stocks move slowly over the business cycle and account for a relatively small part of production, these e¤ects are negligible.
preference shocks may have important e¤ects on the cyclicality of wages and labor productivity.
As the two …gures reveal, technology shocks imply that both wages and labor productivity co-move with hours, whereas preference shocks imply exactly the opposite. When preference shocks become relatively more important, the correlation of wages and labor productivity with hours (and thus output) falls and may even become negative. As Simulation 2 in Table 9 estimates, we …nd that the impact on the relative volatility of wages is very small. 35 We therefore conclude that the observed increase in relative wage volatility is unlikely to come from changes outside the labor market (e.g. smaller exogenous shocks or di¤erent monetary policy).
Increased wage ‡exibility
To assess the e¤ects of increased wage ‡exibility in isolation, we reset the calibration of the 34 Speci…cally, the Smets-Wouters model features sticky nominal price and wage setting that allows for indexation to lagged in ‡ation, external habit persistence in consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization and …xed costs in production. The exogenous shocks are a TFP shock, an investment-speci…c technology shock, a government spending shock, a labor supply shock, an intertemporal preference shock, a price markup shock, and a monetary policy shock. We simulate a loglinearized version of the model using the DYNARE code that Smets and
Wouters supply on the AER website. 35 shock processes in our small DSGE model to their pre-1984 estimates and reduce instead the degree of wage rigidity from = 0:85 to = 0:15. As Simulation 3 in Table 9 shows, this simple increase in wage ‡exibility is capable of generating a substantial increase in the relative volatility of wages.
More speci…cally, the increase in relative wage volatility is due to a modest increase in the absolute volatility of wages (not shown) and a drop in output volatility of about 35%. Hence, the increase in wage ‡exibility not only leads to an increase in wage volatility but also implies smaller business cycle ‡uctuations. At the same time, the increase in wage ‡exibility leads to a counterfactual increase in the correlations of wages and labor productivity with output and hours.
As before, it is useful to consider a graphical illustration to understand the mechanisms behind these results. Figure 2b depicts the impact of a positive technology shock in a labor market with high and low degrees of wage ‡exibility. The low wage ‡exbility case (i.e. = 0:85) is exactly the same case than in Figure 2a; i.e. a positive technology shock shifts out the labor demand curve and the economy moves along a relatively ‡at wage setting curve from point A to point B. Under ‡exible wages (i.e. = 0:15), the reaction of wages to increased labor demand is much stronger because the elasticity of labor supply and the equilibrium income e¤ect of larger consumption now both play a more important role. Firms thus increase labor input and production by a much smaller amount and the labor market moves to point C. The equilibrium response of wages relative to the equilibrium response of hours thus increases as wages become more ‡exible. Furthermore, the correlation of wages with output conditional on technology shocks increases with wage ‡exibility because the reaction of wages becomes more contemporaneous. Likewise, the conditional correlation of labor productivity with output and hours increases with wage ‡exibility because productivity shocks a¤ect output proportionally more than hours (due to decreasing returns to scale of hours in production). Figure 3b depicts the impact of a positive preference shock with relatively rigid and relatively ‡exible wage setting. We start again at point A. Under rigid wage setting, the income e¤ect of the preference shock is small because changes in the marginal rate of substitution exert only a limited e¤ect on wage setting. Hence, the economy ends up at new equilibrium point B, as in Figure   3a , where wages and labor adjust relatively little. Under ‡exible wages, the income e¤ect is much larger. As long as the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is su¢ ciently high (i.e. the wage setting curve is not too steep), the economy ends up at point C where the response of both wages and hours is larger compared to point B. Based on this condition, increased wage ‡exibility leads to larger movements in both wages and hours. Furthermore, larger shifts in the wage setting curve make wages more countercyclical conditional on preference shocks and labor productivity less procyclical (due to decreasing returns to scale of hours in production).
Increased wage ‡exibility and smaller shocks
The above results suggest that an increase in the relative importance of preference shocks brings the model implications of increased wage ‡exibility closer to the data with respect to the cyclicality of wages and labor productivity. To assess this conjecture, we keep = 0:15 (as in Simulation 3) and change the calibration of the two shock processes to their post-1984 estimates (as in Simulation 2). As Simulation 4 in Table 9 shows, the change in shock processes together with increased wage ‡exibility leads to a substantial decrease in the correlation of wages and labor productivity with output and hours. At the same time, output volatility falls slightly below the observed volatility in the post-1984 period. Increased wage ‡exibility together with the decrease in shock volatilities can therefore account for the entire drop in output volatility during the Great Moderation. The decrease in correlations is not su¢ cient to match the labor market dynamics observed in the post-1984 data. Given the stylized nature of our model, this should not come as a big surprise. In particular, any additional shock that a¤ects the marginal rate of substitution (e.g. a labor supply shock or a government spending shock) would further decrease the cyclicality of wages and labor productivity, thus pushing the model implications in the right direction.
We take away three main lessons from the simulations.
1. Changes in exogenous shock processes have substantial impact on the absolute volatility and cyclicality of wages and hours but they cannot account for the observed increase in relative wage volatility. Likewise, structural changes outside of the labor market (i.e. changes that do not directly a¤ect the elasticity of wage setting or labor demand) are an unlikely source of large changes in relative wage volatility.
2. Increased wage ‡exibility makes wages more volatile relative to output, independent of the shock.
3. Increased wage ‡exibility in combination with a decrease in the importance of shocks that shift labor demand (e.g. technology shocks) relative to shocks that shift the labor supply (e.g. preference shocks) allows the model -despite its simplicity -to account for a surprising fraction of the observed changes in the cyclicality of di¤erent labor market variables.
Sources of increased wage ‡exibility
The U.S. labor market has undergone several important changes over the past 25 years that are likely to have led to increased ‡exibility in wage setting. In this section, we focus on two potential sources: deunionization and the shift towards performance-pay contracts. We …rst compare the evolution of these characteristics to the evolution of aggregate wage volatility. Then, we discuss theoretical and empirical work of how changes in these labor market characteristics may lead to increased wage ‡exibility. Finally, we discuss an alternative theory by Gali and Van Rens (2009) who argue that increased wage ‡exibility can be explained by a reduction in search frictions.
Structural changes in the U.S. labor market
In Figure 4 , we plot the evolution of unionization and performance-pay contracts and compare the two measures to the evolution of relative volatility of aggregate wages (HP …ltered, centered As the left panel of Figure 4 shows, unionization has decreased substantially over the past decades, from about 27% in the early 1970s to 12% in 2006. This decline in unionization is welldocumented in the literature and is more pronounced for private-sector workers. The majority of unionized jobs are now concentrated in the public administration sector (e.g. in 2008, union density was 7.6% in the private sector compared to 37% in the public administration sector). As the four panels of Figure 4 show, the di¤erent changes in labor market characteristics roughly coincide with the evolution of relative wage volatility. Both the deunionization of the workforce and the shift towards performance-pay contracts accelerates in the early 1980s as aggregate wages start to become more volatile relative to output. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the decrease in unionization and the increase in performance-pay contracts slow down, the relative volatility of aggregate wages stabilizes at a higher level. Finally, in the mid-1990s, there is another marked but temporary increase in the relative volatility of wages, which coincides with a further reduction in unionization but is not matched by a further increase in performance-pay contracts.
Consequences for wage ‡exibility
We now discuss how deunionization and a shift towards performance-pay contracts may map into our concept of increased wage ‡exibility as described by a reduction of in (6) . Consider …rst the e¤ects of a decrease in unionization. Unions typically negotiate wage contracts for several years ahead and index the contracts to in ‡ation. As Blanchard and Gali (2007) show, such contracts with indexation lead to a staggered real wage structure that is similar in form to the wage setting equation in (6) . A decrease in unionization in such an environment is equivalent to a shortening in contract length for the average worker, thus implying a fall in under the condition that wages of non-unionized workers are more responsive to current economic events.
A shift towards performance-pay contracts has similar consequences for aggregate wage setting provided that …xed-wage contracts are set in advance whereas performance-pay contracts are a function of observed outcomes. Lemieux et al. (2008) While it seems reasonable to assume that both the decrease in unionization and the shift towards performance-pay contracts increase wage ‡exibility on the aggregate level (i.e. a lower ), it is not necessarily the case that these changes lead to more volatile wages in equilibrium. This all depends on whether wages of workers in non-union jobs and on performance-pay contracts are more volatile than wages of their counterparts in unionized jobs and on …xed-wage contracts. This question is addressed in the study by Lemieux et al. (2008) mentioned above. Using PSID data, they
show that wages are most responsive to local labor market shocks (as measured by changes in local unemployment rates) for non-union workers covered by performance-pay schemes, and least responsive for union workers who are not paid for performance. Interestingly, the exact opposite is the case for hours of work, which suggests that wages play an allocative role over the business cycle, as assumed in our model.
The evidence in this section shows that the timing of deunionization and the shift towards performance-pay contracts coincides surprisingly well with the observed increase in aggregate wage volatility. In addition, there are several theoretical and empirical arguments why this common tendency may not just be an coincidence.
Labor hoarding and smaller search frictions
In a recent paper, Gali and Van Rens (2009) explore an alternative explanation based on labor hoarding and search frictions to account for the observed changes in labor market dynamics. Their main hypothesis is that a decline in search frictions over the past decades has lead to a decrease in unobserved work e¤ort variations (i.e. a decrease in labor hoarding). 39 As a result, labor productivity has become less procyclical and the relative volatility of employment has increased, as observed in the data. As long as wages are determined by Nash bargaining, however, the decline in search frictions lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the relative volatility of wages. This result justi…es our decision to leave search frictions out of our analysis: without appealing to some form of change in the wage setting process, search-based models of the labor market are equally incapable of generating the observed large increase in relative wage volatility than competitive models.
the implications of fair wages based on a lagged wage reference. 39 This result follows readily from the assumption that e¤ort per worker has stronger diminishing returns to production and stronger increasing disutility than employment. But by exactly the assumption, a decline in search frictions should also lead to smaller variations in hours per worker; i.e. the volatility of average hours worked relative to the volatility of output should decrease. In the data, however, the volatility of average hours worked (de…ned as total hours divided by employment) decreases only modestly in the post-1984 period. As a result, its volatility relative to the volatility of output increases by almost 70%. 41 We conclude that while Gali and Van Rens' (2009) explanation based on a decline in search frictions is appealing from a theoretical point of view, its predictions for labor market ‡ows and intensive margin adjustment are contradicted by the data. In fact, while the U.S. labor market 40 appears to have become more ‡exible in terms of wage setting, it has become more rigid in terms of employment ‡uctuations at the extensive margin.
Conclusion
This paper documents that the relative volatility of wages increased by a factor of 2.5 to 3.5 during the Great Moderation. Most of this increase in relative wage volatility is due to the fact that while output volatility fell by about 60% during that period, the volatility of aggregate wages remained constant or even increased modestly. CPS microdata reveals that this relative stability of wage volatility applies for many di¤erent groups of workers. As a result, the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is predominantly due to the increase in relative wage volatility across di¤erent groups workers. Compositional changes of the labor force, by contrast, account for at most 10% of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages.
We view these …ndings as an important challenge for macroeconomic modeling in general and explanations of the Great Moderation in particular. Using a small DSGE model, we show that changes in the volatility of exogenous shocks are unlikely to generate sizable changes in relative wage volatility. Similarly, structural changes outside of the labor market are unlikely to a¤ect relative wage volatility. This puts the labor market front and center. In particular, we argue that increased ‡exibility in wage setting has a lot of potential to generate the observed increase in the relative volatility of wages. The main mechanism behind this increase in relative wage volatility is, as in the data, the drop in output volatility that increased wage ‡exibility generates. This general equilibrium e¤ect provides at the same time a promising new explanation for the Great Moderation that has so far been unexplored.
There are many potential sources why wage setting has become more ‡exible over the past decades. Our model is too stylized to distinguish between di¤erent competing explanations. We argue, however, that the marked decline in private-sector unionization and the shift towards performancepay contracts are promising candidates. In future work, it would be interesting to formally assess this hypothesis, both by exploiting disaggregate data and by evaluating general equilibrium models that incorporate more explicit theories of wage setting and labor market frictions.
[50] Manovskii, 
